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China's National Reserve Forest Project contribution to carbon neutrality and path to profitability

Author

Listed:
  • Zhang, Fan
  • Li, Mo
  • Zhang, Shouhong
  • Liu, Jiakai
  • Ren, Yufei
  • Cao, Yini
  • Li, Feilong

Abstract

The National Reserve Forest Project (NRFP) is a forestry project launched by China in 2013 to ensure the safety of timber supply and create a carbon sink, which can contribute to China's future carbon neutrality goals. To evaluate the carbon neutral contribution and carbon sink benefits of the NRFP, it is necessary to estimate the carbon sink amount, carbon sink cost, and carbon sink price. A combined method, modified Hartman model, and Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model were used to estimate and analyze the carbon sink amount, carbon sink cost, and carbon sink price of NRFPs from several typical NRFP zones to the nationwide level. Results show that: (1) if the yearly construction area of the NRFP keeps stable at 10.2 × 105 ha in the future, the carbon sink of NRFP will account for about 17.32%, 28.35%, and 80.00% of total carbon emissions in 2060 under low-, middle-, and high-policy scenarios, respectively, representing an increase compared to the current level of approximately 16%; (2) the weighted average carbon sink cost of NRFP is estimated to be 95.16 CNY/t CO2 e (lower than the average carbon sink cost of 150 CNY/t CO2 e), and several measures such as applying Public-private partnership investment (PPP), increasing project operation duration, and choosing construction areas with low farmland benefit can help further reduce carbon sink cost of NRRP; (3) the reasonable carbon sink price should fall between the carbon sink cost and marginal carbon emission reduction cost of enterprises, and increasing the carbon sink price has a positive impact on NRFP construction. NRFPs suffer economic losses in the present carbon trade market, but they will gradually become profitable with the rising carbon sink price in the future. Therefore, it is imperative to maintain or gradually expand the construction area, provide more financial support, and improve the carbon trading market of NRFPs.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Fan & Li, Mo & Zhang, Shouhong & Liu, Jiakai & Ren, Yufei & Cao, Yini & Li, Feilong, 2024. "China's National Reserve Forest Project contribution to carbon neutrality and path to profitability," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:160:y:2024:i:c:s1389934123002411
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2023.103146
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    References listed on IDEAS

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