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Interdependence of heterogeneous blockholders: Evidence from China

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  • Huang, Xiaoran
  • Kang, Weilong

Abstract

The co-holding of interdependent pairs of heterogeneous blocks can provide firms with stable financial support. The interdependence of heterogeneous blockholders’ investment decision has become an important frontier in the financial literature on large shareholders. In this paper, we study the interdependence of heterogeneous blocks in China. We find significant positive interdependence among blockholders of the same type. In heterogeneous block pairs, the financial–private pair shows positive interdependence. The findings are in contrast to those observed in the US. Under the mixed-ownership reform in China, our findings suggest the potential for cooperation among multiple blocks of the same type rather than between heterogeneous strategic partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Xiaoran & Kang, Weilong, 2024. "Interdependence of heterogeneous blockholders: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:69:y:2024:i:pb:s1544612324012236
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.106194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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