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Does the absence of actual controllers affect corporate ESG performance? Evidence from Chinese listed companies

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  • Jia, Zhiqiang
  • Zhang, Wei

Abstract

This study explores the impact of the absence of actual controllers on corporate ESG performance using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022. Our findings reveal that the absence of actual controllers increases the corporate agency costs and financing constraints, thereby reducing its ESG performance. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced in companies with low internal control quality and less analyst attention. Our results are robust and provide new insights into improving the regulation of companies without actual controllers to enhance their ESG performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jia, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Wei, 2024. "Does the absence of actual controllers affect corporate ESG performance? Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:68:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324009917
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105961
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Xukang & Ma, Chaoqun & Ren, Yi-Shuai, 2024. "How AI powers ESG performance in China's digital frontier?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

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