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Dynamic changes in corporate financialization during CEO tenure

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  • Qi, Bao
  • Fang, Peijie

Abstract

We examine the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate financialization using data of non-financial listed companies in Chinese A-share market from 2010 to 2021. We find that corporate financialization is weakened in the early stage of CEO tenure and strengthened in the late stage. Depending on the predictability of CEO's departure time, we classify departures as normal and abnormal. Only under normal departures do CEOs increase corporate financialization in their late tenure. We also find that CEOs of non-state-owned enterprises, older CEOs, and CEOs with lower shareholding ratio increase corporate financialization more in their late tenure.

Suggested Citation

  • Qi, Bao & Fang, Peijie, 2023. "Dynamic changes in corporate financialization during CEO tenure," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:58:y:2023:i:pb:s1544612323008280
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104456
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zhang, Yongle & Zhang, Haoliang & Yang, Liming & Xu, Pengjie, 2023. "Managerial ownership and corporate financialization," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PD).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO tenure; Corporate financialization; Chinese A-share market; Horizon problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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