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Top Executive Turnover and Loan Loss Provisions: Evidence from Japanese Regional Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiro Enomoto

    (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN)

  • Yusuke Fukaya

    (College of Business Management, J. F. Oberlin University, JAPAN)

Abstract

This study examines loan loss provisions following top executive turnovers in Japanese banks. The study differentiates between voluntary and forced turnover and inside and outside succession. The results show that incoming top executives, following forced turnover or outside succession, tend to reduce loan loss provisions in the second year of their tenure. This suggests that incoming top executives attempt to create a positive impression of their abilities by increasing earnings in the second year. This evidence differs from previous research showing "big bath" accounting in the first year. Additionally, outgoing top executives recognize greater loan loss provisions in the final year before outside succession. This study further shows that incoming top executives attempt to increase earnings following succession through gains and losses from securities sales, commissions, and fees.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiro Enomoto & Yusuke Fukaya, 2023. "Top Executive Turnover and Loan Loss Provisions: Evidence from Japanese Regional Banks," Discussion Paper Series DP2023-06, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2023-06
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    File URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2023-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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