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Say on mobility:Do CEO outside opportunities affect shareholder say on pay?

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  • Canil, Jean
  • Karpavičius, Sigitas
  • Li, Shihe
  • Yu, Chia-Feng

Abstract

We investigate whether shareholders take into account CEO outside opportunities when casting their say on pay (SoP) votes. By employing the staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by US states as an exogenous shock that increases key talent outflow risk, we find that IDD rejection moderates the well-documented positive relation between CEO pay and dissenting SoP votes. The effect is concentrated in firms with more able managers, higher firm efficiency, better operating performance, and greater uncertainty of a new manager's ability. Our results are the first to highlight talent retention as an important motive for affirmative SoP votes.

Suggested Citation

  • Canil, Jean & Karpavičius, Sigitas & Li, Shihe & Yu, Chia-Feng, 2022. "Say on mobility:Do CEO outside opportunities affect shareholder say on pay?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:47:y:2022:i:pb:s1544612322000484
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.102724
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaohui Li & Yao Shen & Jing Xie, 2024. "Proxy Voting on CEO Pay: Evidence from Rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine," Working Papers 202412, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mobility; Inevitable disclosure doctrine; Say on pay votes; Talent retention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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