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A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction

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  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
  • Nonnenmacher, Tomas

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  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Nonnenmacher, Tomas, 1999. "A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 232-245, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:36:y:1999:i:3:p:232-245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 763-770, June.
    2. Eric A. Greenleaf & Atanu R. Sinha, 1996. "Combining Buy-In Penalties with Commissions at Auction Houses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(4), pages 529-540, April.
    3. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    6. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    7. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Deltas, George & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001. "Auctions with an inexpert bidder," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 35-42, October.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    3. Subir Bose & George Deltas, 2007. "Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 1-17, April.
    4. Vagstad, Steinar, 2007. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June.
    5. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007. "The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.
    7. van Bochove, Christiaan & Boerner, Lars & Quint, Daniel, 2012. "Anglo-Dutch premium auctions in eighteenth-century Amsterdam," Discussion Papers 2012/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    8. Peter Maw, 2010. "Yorkshire and Lancashire ascendant: England's textile exports to New York and Philadelphia, 1750–1805," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 63(3), pages 734-768, August.

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