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Thermodynamic chemical energy transfer mechanisms of non-equilibrium, quasi-equilibrium, and equilibrium chemical reactions

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  • Roh, Heui-Seol

Abstract

Chemical energy transfer mechanisms at finite temperature are explored by a chemical energy transfer theory which is capable of investigating various chemical mechanisms of non-equilibrium, quasi-equilibrium, and equilibrium. Gibbs energy fluxes are obtained as a function of chemical potential, time, and displacement. Diffusion, convection, internal convection, and internal equilibrium chemical energy fluxes are demonstrated. The theory reveals that there are chemical energy flux gaps and broken discrete symmetries at the activation chemical potential, time, and displacement. The statistical, thermodynamic theory is the unification of diffusion and internal convection chemical reactions which reduces to the non-equilibrium generalization beyond the quasi-equilibrium theories of migration and diffusion processes. The relationship between kinetic theories of chemical and electrochemical reactions is also explored. The theory is applied to explore non-equilibrium chemical reactions as an illustration. Three variable separation constants indicate particle number constants and play key roles in describing the distinct chemical reaction mechanisms. The kinetics of chemical energy transfer accounts for the four control mechanisms of chemical reactions such as activation, concentration, transition, and film chemical reactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Roh, Heui-Seol, 2015. "Thermodynamic chemical energy transfer mechanisms of non-equilibrium, quasi-equilibrium, and equilibrium chemical reactions," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1029-1049.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:1029-1049
    DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2015.06.049
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ma, Jinpeng, 1996. "On Randomized Matching Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 377-381, August.
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