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Price-capping in partially monopolistic electricity markets with an application to Italy

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  • Bosco, Bruno
  • Parisio, Lucia
  • Pelagatti, Matteo

Abstract

In many electricity markets the production capacity of a single supplier may be necessary to satisfy the total demand even when its competitors offer their total capacity. These pivotal suppliers are expected to sell at monopolistic prices on their portions of the market demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Bosco, Bruno & Parisio, Lucia & Pelagatti, Matteo, 2013. "Price-capping in partially monopolistic electricity markets with an application to Italy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 257-266.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:54:y:2013:i:c:p:257-266
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Bosco & Parisio Lucia & Matteo Pelagatti, 2016. "Price Coordination in Vertically Integrated Electricity Markets: Theory and Empirical Evidence," The Energy Journal, , vol. 37(1), pages 181-194, January.
    2. Facchini, Angelo & Rubino, Alessandro & Caldarelli, Guido & Di Liddo, Giuseppe, 2019. "Changes to Gate Closure and its impact on wholesale electricity prices: The case of the UK," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 110-121.
    3. Rossetto, F. & Grossi, L. & Pollitt, M., 2019. "Assessing Market Power in the Italian Electricity Market: A synthetic supply approach," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1975, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Angelica Gianfreda, Lucia Parisio and Matteo Pelagatti, 2016. "The Impact of RES in the Italian DayAhead and Balancing Markets," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Bollino-M).
    5. Bigerna, Simona & Andrea Bollino, Carlo & Polinori, Paolo, 2015. "Marginal cost and congestion in the Italian electricity market: An indirect estimation approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 445-454.
    6. Bruno Bosco, 2020. "Auctioning C02 Emission Allowances in Europe. A Time Series Analysis of Equilibrium Prices," Working Papers 448, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.

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