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The large-scale integration of wind generation: Impacts on price, reliability and dispatchable conventional suppliers

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  • MacCormack, John
  • Hollis, Aidan
  • Zareipour, Hamidreza
  • Rosehart, William

Abstract

This work examines the effects of large-scale integration of wind powered electricity generation in a deregulated energy-only market on loads (in terms of electricity prices and supply reliability) and dispatchable conventional power suppliers. Hourly models of wind generation time series, load and resultant residual demand are created. From these a non-chronological residual demand duration curve is developed that is combined with a probabilistic model of dispatchable conventional generator availability, a model of an energy-only market with a price cap, and a model of generator costs and dispatch behavior. A number of simulations are performed to evaluate the effect on electricity prices, overall reliability of supply, the ability of a dominant supplier acting strategically to profitably withhold supplies, and the fixed cost recovery of dispatchable conventional power suppliers at different levels of wind generation penetration. Medium and long term responses of the market and/or regulator in the long term are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • MacCormack, John & Hollis, Aidan & Zareipour, Hamidreza & Rosehart, William, 2010. "The large-scale integration of wind generation: Impacts on price, reliability and dispatchable conventional suppliers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 3837-3846, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:7:p:3837-3846
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