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LNG development across Europe: Infrastructural and regulatory analysis

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  • Dorigoni, Susanna
  • Portatadino, Sergio

Abstract

In this paper, a cross-section infrastructural and regulatory analysis of the European LNG sector is presented. The LNG chain is maintained as being a good tool to enlarge the number of natural gas exporters to Europe, adding in this way to competition and to the achievement of the targets of the liberalisation process, which is a decrease in price for final customers and security of supply. The main reason for this is to be identified in the minor specificity of the regasification-plant-related investment compared with pipeline transportation. As a matter of fact, as the infrastructural analysis will show, the construction of new LNG receiving terminals is likely to bring about an increase in the number of importers fostering competition among them and shrinking their margins among the value chain. In this context, regulation is meant to play a key role in promoting investments without hindering competition. Nevertheless it is questionable whether LNG will be able to introduce competition beyond the European border (that is among producers) according to the forecasted supply and demand balance that is leading to a seller's market in the upstream sector. In this case, a huger part of the rent would go to the exporters leaving minor scope for competition down the European border.

Suggested Citation

  • Dorigoni, Susanna & Portatadino, Sergio, 2008. "LNG development across Europe: Infrastructural and regulatory analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 3366-3373, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:36:y:2008:i:9:p:3366-3373
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    Cited by:

    1. Park, Sun-Young & Yoo, Seung-Hoon, 2013. "The economic value of LNG in the Korean manufacturing industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 403-407.
    2. Girma T. Chala & Abd Rashid Abd Aziz & Ftwi Y. Hagos, 2018. "Natural Gas Engine Technologies: Challenges and Energy Sustainability Issue," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-44, October.
    3. Martin Jurkovič & Tomáš Kalina & Ondrej Stopka & Piotr Gorzelanczyk & Borna Abramović, 2021. "Economic Calculation and Operations Research in Terms of LNG Carriage by Water Transport: A Case Study of the Port of Bratislava," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-25, March.
    4. Monforti, F. & Szikszai, A., 2010. "A MonteCarlo approach for assessing the adequacy of the European gas transmission system under supply crisis conditions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 2486-2498, May.
    5. Shi, Guo-Hua & Jing, You-Yin & Wang, Song-Ling & Zhang, Xu-Tao, 2010. "Development status of liquefied natural gas industry in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7457-7465, November.
    6. Li, Yongliang & Wang, Xiang & Ding, Yulong, 2012. "An optimal design methodology for large-scale gas liquefaction," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 484-490.
    7. Dorigoni, Susanna & Graziano, Clara & Pontoni, Federico, 2010. "Can LNG increase competitiveness in the natural gas market?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(12), pages 7653-7664, December.

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