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The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion

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  • Omonbude, Ekpen J.

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  • Omonbude, Ekpen J., 2007. "The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6188-6194, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:35:y:2007:i:12:p:6188-6194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2002. "Endogenous bargaining power," Economics Working Papers 644, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Compensation and Bargaining with Entrpreneurship as the Outside Option," CESifo Working Paper Series 314, CESifo.
    6. Charles E. Lindblom, 1948. ""Bargaining Power" in Price and Wage Determination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 62(3), pages 396-417.
    7. Sen, Arijit, 2000. "Multidimensional Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 425-450, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. dos Santos, Sidney Pereira & Eugenio Leal, José & Oliveira, Fabrício, 2011. "The development of a natural gas transportation logistics management system," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 4774-4784, September.
    2. Menegaki, Angeliki N., 2011. "Bourgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline; will matching institutional and regulatory contexts lead to an effective bargaining and eventual consensus?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1277-1285, March.
    3. repec:bla:opecrv:v:33:y:2009:i:2:p:125-139 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dastan, Seyit Ali, 2018. "Negotiation of a cross-border natural gas pipeline: An analytical contribution to the discussions on Turkish Stream," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 749-760.

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