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Political incentives, Party Congress, and pollution cycle: empirical evidence from China

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  • Tian, Zhihua
  • Tian, Yanfang

Abstract

The political incentives of local officials affect their preferences for policy options. This study examines the impact of the convening cycle of Provincial Communist Party Congresses (PCPCs) in China on pollution emission intensity. Based on the data of 281 cities and city officials from 2003 to 2014, the present study finds strong evidence of a political pollution cycle manifesting as significant increases in pollution emission intensity before PCPCs followed by visible decreases after PCPCs. PCPCs provide city officials with strong political incentives to pursue short-term economic performance before congresses, which leads to a surge in pollution emission intensity. The difference in pollution emission intensity before and after the PCPCs reveals the existence of such political incentives. The findings suggest that a significant relationship exists between the political incentives of city officials and environmental pollution. Therefore, the effective governance of environmental pollution must involve changing the incentive structure of city officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian, Zhihua & Tian, Yanfang, 2021. "Political incentives, Party Congress, and pollution cycle: empirical evidence from China," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 188-204, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:26:y:2021:i:2:p:188-204_5
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    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Zhihua & Hu, An & Chen, Yang & Shao, Shuai, 2023. "Local officials’ tenure and CO2 emissions in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    2. Shao, Shuai & Yang, Zhenbing & Xu, Le & Yang, Lili, 2024. "Environmental protection experience of secretaries and effectiveness of environmental governance: Evidence from COD discharge in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 237-253.
    3. Wang, Qingxi & Hu, An & Tian, Zhihua, 2022. "Digital transformation and electricity consumption: Evidence from the Broadband China pilot policy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    4. Can Zhang & Jixia Li, 2024. "The Impact of Official Promotion Incentives on Urban Ecological Welfare Performance and Its Spatial Effect," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(7), pages 1-29, April.

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