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How effective are energy-efficiency incentive programs? Evidence from Italian homeowners

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  • Alberini, Anna
  • Bigano, Andrea

Abstract

We evaluate incentives for residential energy upgrades in Italy using data from an original survey of Italian homeowners. In this paper, attention is restricted to heating system replacements, and to the effect of monetary and non-monetary incentives on the propensity to replace the heating equipment with a more efficient one. To get around adverse selection and free riding issues, we ask stated preference questions to those who weren't planning energy efficiency upgrades any time soon. We argue that these persons are not affected by these behaviors. We use their responses to fit an energy-efficiency renovations curve that predicts the share of the population that will undertake these improvements for any given incentive level. This curve is used to estimate the CO2 emissions saved and their cost-effectiveness. Respondents are more likely to agree to a replacement when the savings on the energy bills are larger and experienced over a longer horizon, and when rebates are offered to them. Reminding the respondents about possible CO2 emissions reductions (our non-monetary incentive) had little effect. Even under optimistic assumptions, monetary incentives similar to those in the Italian tax credit program are generally not cost-effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberini, Anna & Bigano, Andrea, 2015. "How effective are energy-efficiency incentive programs? Evidence from Italian homeowners," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(S1), pages 76-85.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:52:y:2015:i:s1:p:s76-s85
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy-efficiency incentives; Free riding; Adverse selection; Stated preferences; CO2 emissions reductions; CO2 emissions reductions supply curves; Residential energy consumption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects

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