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Convex combinatorial auction of pipeline network capacities

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  • Csercsik, Dávid

Abstract

In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of bidding for route–quantity pairs. Each participant defines a limited number of routes and places multiple bids, corresponding to various quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mechanism assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its called convex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model are determined according to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves principle. We compare the efficiency of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the method currently used for pipeline capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneous ascending clock auction of pipeline capacities) via simulation, according to various measures, such as resulting and net utility of players, utilization of network capacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.

Suggested Citation

  • Csercsik, Dávid, 2022. "Convex combinatorial auction of pipeline network capacities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:111:y:2022:i:c:s0140988322002481
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Zhengbing & Liao, Qi & Zhang, Hao & Zhang, Jicai & Tu, Renfu & Liang, Yongtu, 2024. "Pipe sharing: A capacity allocation method for incorporating economy and fairness in the multiproduct pipeline," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 311(C).
    2. Liao, Qi & Tu, Renfu & Zhang, Wan & Wang, Bohong & Liang, Yongtu & Zhang, Haoran, 2023. "Auction design for capacity allocation in the petroleum pipeline under fair opening," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural gas networks; Capacity allocation; Modeling; Mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C54 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Quantitative Policy Modeling
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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