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State ownership and corporate innovative efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Cao, Xiaping
  • Cumming, Douglas
  • Zhou, Sili

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the innovative efficiency of SOEs in China. Innovative efficiency refers to output of patents per dollar spending of R&D expenditure. The data indicate that minority SOEs are substantially more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs and majority SOEs. The relative innovative efficiency of minority SOEs is more pronounced among firms with high financial constraints. The data are consistent with the view that, in the Chinese context, there are favorable benefits to partial state ownership through access to talent, connections, and technological resources that enable efficient patent outcomes from R&D expenditure.

Suggested Citation

  • Cao, Xiaping & Cumming, Douglas & Zhou, Sili, 2020. "State ownership and corporate innovative efficiency," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:44:y:2020:i:c:s1566014119305072
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100699
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State ownership; Innovative efficiency; Financial constraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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