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A computationally efficient approach to optimizing offers in centrally committed electricity markets

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  • Jiang, Yuzhou
  • Sioshansi, Ramteen

Abstract

We study the incentive properties of the two primary approaches to incorporating unit-commitment decisions in wholesale electricity markets. One approach is centralized unit commitment, wherein generating firms provide complex multi-part offers that specify their non-convex fixed and variable operating costs. The market operator uses these offers to co-optimize unit-commitment and economic-dispatch decisions. The second approach is self-commitment, whereby firms determine unit-commitment decisions for their generating units individually and submit simple offers for the provision of energy. Operators of self-committed markets determine generator dispatch based on the merit order of the simple offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiang, Yuzhou & Sioshansi, Ramteen, 2024. "A computationally efficient approach to optimizing offers in centrally committed electricity markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 317(1), pages 25-42.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:317:y:2024:i:1:p:25-42
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.01.040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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