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Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry

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  • Kort, Peter M.
  • Wrzaczek, Stefan

Abstract

The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that under an open-loop information structure the incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting, whereas in the Markov perfect equilibrium the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before the entry. The entry cost level where entry accommodation passes into entry deterrence is lower in the Markov perfect equilibrium. Further we find that the incumbent’s capital stock level needed to deter entry is hump shaped as a function of the entry time, whereas the corresponding entry cost, where the entrant is indifferent between entry and non-entry, is U-shaped.

Suggested Citation

  • Kort, Peter M. & Wrzaczek, Stefan, 2015. "Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(1), pages 281-292.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:246:y:2015:i:1:p:281-292
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kuno J.M. Huisman & Peter M. Kort, 2015. "Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 376-408, June.
    2. Barucci, Emilio, 1998. "Optimal Investments with Increasing Returns to Scale," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 789-808, August.
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    5. Dawid, H. & Kopel, M. & Kort, P.M., 2013. "R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 527-537.
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    14. Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell, 2007. "Duopoly Dynamics with a Barrier to Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-037/3, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandra Buratto & Stefan Wrzaczek, 2018. "Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 463-487, November.
    2. Wencheng Yu & Xingang Wen & Nick F. D. Huberts & Peter M. Kort, 2024. "Strategic investment under uncertainty: why multi-option firms lose the preemption run," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 75(9), pages 1855-1872, September.
    3. Seidl, Andrea, 2019. "Zeno points in optimal control models with endogenous regime switching," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 353-368.
    4. Dmitry Gromov & Ekaterina Gromova, 2017. "On a Class of Hybrid Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 266-288, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics; Game theory; Dynamic programming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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