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Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information

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  • Alvarez, Francisco
  • Mazon, Cristina

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  • Alvarez, Francisco & Mazon, Cristina, 2007. "Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 253-266, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:179:y:2007:i:1:p:253-266
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    1. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1998. "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 25-42, April.
    2. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    4. Menezes F. M. & Monteiro, P. K., 1996. "Existence of equilibrium in a descriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-61, February.
    5. McAdams, David, 2002. "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working papers 4254-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    6. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    7. Jaime F. Zender & James J.D. Wang, 2002. "Auctioning divisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 673-705.
    8. Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2006. "Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 284-303, October.
    9. Michael B. Gordy, 1999. "Hedging Winner'S Curse With Multiple Bids: Evidence From The Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(3), pages 448-465, August.
    10. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    11. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    13. Michael B. Gordy, "undated". "Multiple Bids in a Multiple-Unit Common Value Auction," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _021, Society for Computational Economics.
    14. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
    15. Ilan Kremer, 2004. "Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 849-877.
    16. Hans Haller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "A discrete model of discriminatory price auctions - an alternative to Menezes-Monteiro," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-08, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Leonardo Bartolini & Carlo Cottarelli, 1997. "Designing effective auctions for treasury securities," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(Jul).
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón, 2016. "Price volatility in the secondary market and bidders’ heterogeneous behavior in Spanish Treasury auctions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1435-1466, June.

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