IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v174y2006i2p816-834.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale

Author

Listed:
  • Jin, Mingzhou
  • Wu, S. David
  • Erkoc, Murat

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David & Erkoc, Murat, 2006. "Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 816-834, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:174:y:2006:i:2:p:816-834
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377-2217(05)00370-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
    2. Michael H. Rothkopf & Aleksandar Pekev{c} & Ronald M. Harstad, 1998. "Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1131-1147, August.
    3. Gail Hohner & John Rich & Ed Ng & Grant Reid & Andrew J. Davenport & Jayant R. Kalagnanam & Ho Soo Lee & Chae An, 2003. "Combinatorial and Quantity-Discount Procurement Auctions Benefit Mars, Incorporated and Its Suppliers," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 33(1), pages 23-35, February.
    4. Teich, Jeffrey E. & Wallenius, Hannele & Wallenius, Jyrki & Koppius, Otto R., 2004. "Emerging multiple issue e-auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 1-16, November.
    5. Michael H. Rothkopf, 1977. "Bidding in Simultaneous Auctions with a Constraint on Exposure," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 620-629, August.
    6. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    7. Wedad Elmaghraby, 2003. "The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 673-682, May.
    8. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    9. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1999. "Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 193-220, January.
    10. Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Rothkopf, Michael H. & Hyde, Laurel C. & O'Neill, Richard P., 2000. "Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-32, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Dongxu & Yang, Zhongzhen, 2018. "Systematic optimization of port clusters along the Maritime Silk Road in the context of industry transfer and production capacity constraints," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 174-189.
    2. Kokott, Gian-Marco & Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2019. "The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(1), pages 202-210.
    3. Li, Yung-Ming & Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua, 2011. "Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(3), pages 722-731, November.
    4. Jin, Mingzhou & Junfang Yu, Andrew, 2015. "Procurement auctions and supply chain performance," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 192-200.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elena Katok & Alvin E. Roth, 2004. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(8), pages 1044-1063, August.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Wedad Elmaghraby, 2003. "The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 673-682, May.
    5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012. "System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 12acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    6. Avenali, Alessandro, 2009. "Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: The threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(1), pages 262-275, November.
    7. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    8. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
    9. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
    10. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2009. "Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 855-882, April.
    11. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    12. Munro, David R. & Rassenti, Stephen J., 2019. "Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 195-217.
    13. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    14. Michael H. Rothkopf, 2007. "Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 191-197, April.
    15. R. H. Kwon & G. Anandalingam & L. H. Ungar, 2005. "Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 407-418, March.
    16. Jawad Abrache & Teodor Crainic & Michel Gendreau & Monia Rekik, 2007. "Combinatorial auctions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 131-164, September.
    17. Dries R. Goossens & Sander Onderstal & Jan Pijnacker & Frits C. R. Spieksma, 2014. "Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 351-363, August.
    18. Joni L. Jones & Gary J. Koehler, 2005. "A Heuristic for Winner Determination in Rule-Based Combinatorial Auctions," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 475-489, November.
    19. Marcelo Olivares & Gabriel Y. Weintraub & Rafael Epstein & Daniel Yung, 2012. "Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(8), pages 1458-1481, August.
    20. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997. "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:174:y:2006:i:2:p:816-834. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.