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Fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two-enterprise supply chains

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  • Gjerdrum, Jonatan
  • Shah, Nilay
  • Papageorgiou, Lazaros G.

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  • Gjerdrum, Jonatan & Shah, Nilay & Papageorgiou, Lazaros G., 2002. "Fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two-enterprise supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 582-599, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:143:y:2002:i:3:p:582-599
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Faiz A. Al-Khayyal & James E. Falk, 1983. "Jointly Constrained Biconvex Programming," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 273-286, May.
    7. Pfeiffer, Thomas, 1999. "Transfer pricing and decentralized dynamic lot-sizing in multistage, multiproduct production processes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 319-330, July.
    8. Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1996. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 26-38, March.
    9. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    10. John H. Lindsey, II & William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, 1996. "Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 220-231, February.
    11. Heide, Jan B. & Stump, Rodney L., 1995. "Performance implications of buyer-supplier relationships in industrial markets : A transaction cost explanation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 57-66, January.
    12. Bruce C. Arntzen & Gerald G. Brown & Terry P. Harrison & Linda L. Trafton, 1995. "Global Supply Chain Management at Digital Equipment Corporation," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 69-93, February.
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