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Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting

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  • Radhakrishnan, Suresh
  • Ronen, Joshua

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  • Radhakrishnan, Suresh & Ronen, Joshua, 1999. "Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 138-157, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:115:y:1999:i:1:p:138-157
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    3. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Zhengping & Crama, Pascale & Zhu, Wanshan, 2012. "The newsvendor’s optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(1), pages 171-181.
    2. Claire Bonnard, 2011. "Les incitations à l'innovation dans le secteur privé," Post-Print halshs-00599700, HAL.

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