The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements
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- Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022. "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2423-2470, August.
- Opp, Marcus & Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2020. "The economics of deferral and clawback requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 15081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Stefano Colonnello & Giuliano Curatola & Shuo Xia, 2024. "When Does Linking Pay to Default Reduce Bank Risk?," Working Papers 2024: 07, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
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More about this item
Keywords
Financial regulation; Moral hazard; Compensation design; Clawbacks; Bonus deferral; Short-termism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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