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Almost common values auctions revisited

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  • Levin, Dan
  • Kagel, John H.

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  • Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H., 2005. "Almost common values auctions revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1125-1136, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:5:p:1125-1136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    3. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, September.
    4. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1988. "Reputation in repeated second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-119, October.
    5. Christopher Avery & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Second‐Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 573-603, September.
    6. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2015. "Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria," Post-Print hal-01735849, HAL.
    2. Marco Pagnozzi, 2008. "Are Disadvanteged Bidders Doomed In Ascending Auctions?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 683-683, September.
    3. Coatney, Kalyn T. & Shaffer, Sherrill L. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2012. "Auction prices, market share, and a common agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 61-73.
    4. Oliver Kirchkamp & Wladislaw Mill, 2019. "Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding," CESifo Working Paper Series 7631, CESifo.
    5. de Frutos, M.A. & Jarque, X., 2007. "Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(7-8), pages 795-817, September.
    6. Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin, 2008. "Hybrid auctions revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 591-594, June.
    7. Rose, Susan L. & Levin, Dan, 2008. "An experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 927-946, September.
    8. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2015. "Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 125-140, February.
    9. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2009. "Tournaments of Weakly Heterogeneous Players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 819-855, October.
    10. LI Daniel Zhiyun, 2012. "Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    11. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July.
    12. Griffin, Robert, 2013. "Auction designs for allocating wind energy leases on the U.S. outer continentalshelf," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 603-611.
    13. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2021. "Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 616-635.

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