IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v46y2002i3p613-621.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Revisiting the case for a populist central banker: A comment

Author

Listed:
  • Guzzo, Vincenzo
  • Velasco, Andres

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 2002. "Revisiting the case for a populist central banker: A comment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 613-621, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:3:p:613-621
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014-2921(01)00178-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lippi, Francesco, 2002. "Revisiting the case for a populist central banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 601-612, March.
    2. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Cuciniello, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy under a floating regime with non-atomistic wage setters," IHEID Working Papers 12-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    2. Cuciniello, Vincenzo, 2007. "Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," MPRA Paper 3789, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007.
    3. Cavallari, Lilia, 2012. "Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 160-163.
    4. Cuciniello Vincenzo, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," wp.comunite 0014, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    5. Lawler, Phillip, 2005. "Central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 323-329, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    2. Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 15, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Cavallari, Lilia, 2001. "Inflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters," ZEI Working Papers B 11-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    4. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
    5. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
    6. Tilemahos Efthimiadis, 2007. "On Central Bank Independence, Wage Indexing And A Monopoly Union," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 25-36, January.
    7. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker & Ronnie Schöb, 2004. "Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(3), pages 585-605, November.
    8. Lilia Cavallari, 2001. "Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 419-433, December.
    9. Cuciniello, Vincenzo, 2007. "Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," MPRA Paper 3789, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007.
    10. Cuciniello Vincenzo, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters," wp.comunite 0014, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    11. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
    12. Lawler, Phillip, 2005. "Central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 323-329, March.
    13. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2020. "Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 691-705, July.
    14. Griebeler, Marcelo de Carvalho, 2015. "The Naive Central Banker," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 69(3), September.
    15. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2007. "Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 281-289, July.
    17. Marcelo De Carvalho Griebeler, 2016. "On The Existence Of Loss Function For Some Useful Classes Of Central Bankers," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 121, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    18. Benczes, István & Szabó, Krisztina, 2023. "Társadalmi törésvonalak és gazdasági (ir)racionalitások. A közgazdaságtan szerepe és helye a populizmus kutatásában [Social cleavages and economic (ir)rationalities: The role of economics in populi," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 23-54.
    19. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 541-565, July.
    20. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:3:p:613-621. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.