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Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market

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  • Gottfries, Nils
  • McCormick, Barry

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  • Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:1-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1989. "A Theory of Wage Dispersion and Job Market Segmentation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 121-137.
    2. Barry McCormick, 1990. "A Theory of Signalling During Job Search, Employment Efficiency, and "Stigmatised" Jobs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 299-313.
    3. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    4. Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, 1987. "The Evolution of Unemployment in the United States: 1968–1985," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1987, Volume 2, pages 11-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Albert Ma, Ching-to & Weiss, Andrew M., 1993. "A signaling theory of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 135-157, January.
    6. Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Why is the Unemployment Rate So Very High near Full Employment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 17(2), pages 339-396.
    7. Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January.
    8. Cain, Glen G, 1976. "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 1215-1257, December.
    9. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zenou, Yves, 2002. "How do firms redline workers?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 391-408, November.
    2. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-525, July.
    3. Hamilton, Jonathan & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "Wage Competition with Heterogeneous Workers and Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 453-472, July.
    4. P R Agénor, 2005. "The Analytics of Segmented Labor Markets," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 52, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    5. Tasnadi, Attila, 2005. "A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 191-203, April.
    6. AGENOR Pierre-Richard & IZQUIERDO Alejandro & FOFACK Hippolyte, 2010. "IMMPA: A Quantitative Macroeconomic Framework for the Analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategies," EcoMod2003 330700003, EcoMod.
    7. Frijters, P., 1998. "Discrimination and job-uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 433-446, September.
    8. Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January.
    9. Paul Frijters, 1997. "Capital scarcities as a reason for high unemployment in the European Union," Macroeconomics 9706002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. WAUTHY, Xavier & ZENOU, Yves, 1997. "Efficiency wages, labor heterogeneity and the fInancing of the training cost," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Izquierdo, Alejandro & Fofack, Hippolyte, 2003. "The integrated macroeconomic model for poverty analysis : a quantitative macroeconomic framework for the analysis of poverty reduction strategies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3092, The World Bank.
    12. Robert S. Chase, 2001. "Labor Market Discrimination During Post-Communist Transition: A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia's Russian Minority," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 381, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    13. Agenor,Pierre-Richard, 2003. "The mini-integrated macroeconomic model for poverty analysis : a framework for analyzing the unemployment and poverty effects of fiscal and labor market reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3067, The World Bank.
    14. Núria Rodríquez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona School of Economics.

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