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On political ambiguity and anti-median platforms

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  • Tolvanen, Juha

Abstract

This paper constructs a new, information-based explanation for political ambiguity and the success of anti-median platforms. It argues that voters’ and candidates’ correlated preferences about the appropriate policy combined with ambiguous platforms can help candidates with non-median preferences increase their support and even win against a median candidate. I show how ambiguity can arise in a standard citizen-candidate setting where voters have different preferences, in its extension with primaries, and even in a Condorcet jury model where disagreement arises only from differences in voters’ information. The paper also offers a formal framework that allows for dog whistle politics. The model illustrates how ambiguity can have important negative welfare implications. Specifically, I show that despite having ex-ante identical preferences with voters, politicians may choose ambiguous platforms even if voters would be keen on banning them.

Suggested Citation

  • Tolvanen, Juha, 2024. "On political ambiguity and anti-median platforms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:170:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124002137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political ambiguity; Citizen-candidate; Condorcet voting; Dog whistle politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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