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Blockholdings in closely held corporations: An analysis of ownership coalitions in emerging countries

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  • Bole, Velimir
  • Habuš, Ada Guštin
  • Koman, Matjaž
  • Prašnikar, Janez

Abstract

Blockholdings in closely held corporations have been examined in the literature to understand the importance of the size and structure of minimal coalitions in a volatile macroeconomic environment. We show, theoretically and empirically, that three-member minimal controlling coalitions provide the best performance results because the portfolio of potential strategies of such coalitions can increase strategic choices in the boom-bust-recovery cycle, but coordination costs are not that high. We also show that “competition” between potential minimal controlling coalitions (of the same firm) with two or more members improves the firm’s performance. With respect to the characteristics of the institutional owners of one-member controlling coalitions, we found that firms controlled by foreigners and/or other non-financial firms and financial holdings performed better than the average firm. Our study indicates that the change of ownership structures in emerging countries is determined by the extant economic systems and through administrative interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bole, Velimir & Habuš, Ada Guštin & Koman, Matjaž & Prašnikar, Janez, 2023. "Blockholdings in closely held corporations: An analysis of ownership coalitions in emerging countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:47:y:2023:i:2:s0939362523000018
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2023.101072
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple shareholders; Minimal controlling coalition; Corporate governance; Efficiency of firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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