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Nash implementation in pure public good economies

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  • Zhou, Lin

Abstract

I study Nash implementation in a model of pure public good economies without the controversial no veto power condition. I prove that any social choice correspondence that is monotonic and satisfies unanimity and minimal liberty can be implemented in Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Lin, 2008. "Nash implementation in pure public good economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 470-473, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:470-473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    3. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
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