Supply shocks, private sector information and monetary policy: Is there inevitably a stabilization trade-off?
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Cited by:
- James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2008. "Aggregate demand shocks, private signals and employment variability: Can better information be harmful?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 101-104, July.
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