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Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects

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  • Candel-Sanchez, Francisco

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  • Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 56-59, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:90:y:2006:i:1:p:56-59
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    1. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
    2. Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
    3. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
    4. Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-1293, December.
    5. Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July.
    6. Eyckmans, Johan, 1997. "Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 314-330, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Candel-Sánchez, 2012. "Pigouvian taxes and the Varian’s mechanism in dynamic settings," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 39-51, August.
    2. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 517-526, July.

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