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Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment

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  • Devetag, Giovanna

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  • Devetag, Giovanna, 2005. "Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 227-232, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:2:p:227-232
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    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521570176 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    3. Giovanna Devetag, 2003. "Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June.
    4. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2001. "Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 345-351, December.
    5. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
    6. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
    7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521578967 is not listed on IDEAS
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