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A model of competing selling mechanisms

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  • Chen, Yongmin
  • Wang, Ruqu

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  • Chen, Yongmin & Wang, Ruqu, 2004. "A model of competing selling mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 151-155, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:85:y:2004:i:2:p:151-155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
    2. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 30-66, March.
    3. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    4. Wang, Ruqu, 1993. "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 838-851, September.
    5. Birger Wernerfelt, 1994. "Selling Formats for Search Goods," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 298-309.
    6. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Parlane, 2008. "Auctioning Horizontally Differentiated Items," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(2), pages 113-128, September.
    2. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2004. "Equilibrium Selling Mechanisms," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 335-355, November.

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