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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof

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  • Benoit, Jean-Pierre

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  • Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2000. "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 319-322, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:3:p:319-322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
    2. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-417, June.
    3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weber, Tjark, 2009. "Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," MPRA Paper 17836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Salvador Barberà, 2003. "A Theorem on Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 166, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. repec:cte:werepe:we081207 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Miljkovic, Dragan, 2009. "International organizations and arrangements: Pivotal countries and manipulations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1398-1402, November.
    5. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
    6. Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar, 2012. "Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 418-421.

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