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A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle

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  • Shuhe Li

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  • Shuhe Li, 1995. "A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 335-343, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:49:y:1995:i:4:p:335-343
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    1. Mount, Kenneth & Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "The informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 161-192, June.
    2. Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 453-475.
    3. Li, S., 1993. "A Unified Framework for Implementation, the Revelation Principle, and Optimal Approximation," Papers 266, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    5. E. Maskin, 1978. "Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium," Working papers 216, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    6. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    7. Hurwicz, Leonid, 2005. "Incentive aspects of decentralization," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1441-1482, Elsevier.
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