Strategic delegation in bargaining
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Cited by:
- Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2020. "Equilibrium opacity in ultimatum‐offer bargaining," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1515-1529, September.
- Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021.
"The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
- Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2020. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-020, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Maria Arvaniti & Wolfgang Habla, 2020. "The Political Economy of Negotiating International Carbon Markets," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 20/335, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Alessandro Tavoni & Ralph Winkler, 2021.
"Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation,"
Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 225-243, October.
- Alessandro Tavoni & Ralph Winkler, 2020. "Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers wp1154, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Tavoni, Alessandro & Winkler, Ralph, 2021. "Domestic pressure and international climate cooperation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112608, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018.
"Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
- Wolfgang Habla & Ralph Winkler, 2017. "Strategic Delegation and International Permit Markets: Why Linking May Fail," CESifo Working Paper Series 6515, CESifo.
- Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2017. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking may fail," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2009.
"On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 281-296, April.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2006. "On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements," Working Papers 200624, CERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements," Working Papers halshs-00562632, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2009. "On the Strategic use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements," Post-Print hal-00366999, HAL.
- Schotter, Andrew & Zheng, Wei & Snyder, Blaine, 2000.
"Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 248-292, February.
- Schotter, Andrew & Snyder, Blaine & Zheng, Wei, 1995. "Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment," Working Papers 95-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 175-195, March.
- Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2015. "Strategic Delegation and Non-cooperative International Permit Markets," Working Papers in Economics 636, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
- Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022.
"Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
- Sarah Spycher & Ralph Winkler, 2020. "Strategic Delegation in the Formation of Modest International Environmental Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 8769, CESifo.
- Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2021. "Strategic Delegation in the Formation of Modest International Environmental Agreements," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242366, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2015. "Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 599-629, August.
- Julian Lamprecht & Marcel Thum, 2023.
"Opacity in bargaining over public good provision,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(5), pages 1069-1095, October.
- Julian Lamprecht & Marcel Thum, 2022. "Opacity in Bargaining over Public Good Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series 9871, CESifo.
- Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2015. "Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 399-414, September.
- Eckert, Heather, 2003. "Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, July.
- Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
- Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 674-691, May.
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