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Promoting cooperation by leading: Leader-selection mechanisms in public goods games

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  • He, Yunwen
  • Zheng, Jie

Abstract

We conducted an experimental comparison of four leader-selection mechanisms in a public goods game. The results show that purely voluntary leadership yields the weakest overall performance, primarily attributed to the lack of cooperation in leaderless groups and the subpar leadership exhibited by multiple leaders. A new insight from our study is that voluntary leadership by randomly-selected candidates outperforms both exogenously appointed and self-appointed leadership. This superiority likely stems from the mechanism's capability to balance between leaders setting a sufficiently positive example and followers responding reciprocally.

Suggested Citation

  • He, Yunwen & Zheng, Jie, 2024. "Promoting cooperation by leading: Leader-selection mechanisms in public goods games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002015
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111718
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Cooperation; Leadership; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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