Can transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111135
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More about this item
Keywords
Adverse selection; Annuities; Market transparency; Chilean pension system;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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