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Firm asset structure and risk aversion

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  • Wang, Chenxi

Abstract

I study the optimal portfolio choice of risk-averse entrepreneurs in a costly state verification framework. The model generates opposite responses of firm leverage and safe asset share, which are consistent with the empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Chenxi, 2022. "Firm asset structure and risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:221:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003871
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110913
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Hoddenbagh & Mikhail Dmitriev, 2017. "The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal State-Dependent Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 24, pages 43-65, March.
    2. Giacomo Candian & Mikhail Dmitriev, 2020. "Risk Aversion, Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 299-322, July.
    3. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Matthias Paustian, 2016. "Optimal Contracts, Aggregate Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 119-147, January.
    4. Cesar Tamayo, 2015. "Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 547-577, August.
    5. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk aversion; Safe asset; Leverage; Business cycle; Financial accelerator;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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