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Gagan Ghosh

Personal Details

First Name:Gagan
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ghosh
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgh231
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/gaganghosh/home

Affiliation

Department of Economics
College of Business Administration and Economics
California State University-Fullerton

Fullerton, California (United States)
http://business.fullerton.edu/economics/
RePEc:edi:edcsfus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Bougt, Daniel & Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2023. "Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  2. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
  3. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021. "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  4. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.
  5. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020. "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  6. Liu, Heng & Ghosh, Gagan, 2020. "A note on perfect correlated equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  7. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
  8. Gagan Ghosh & Steven Stong, 2018. "Strategic budgets in sequential elimination contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 499-524, August.
  9. Gagan Ghosh, 2015. "Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 253-274, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021. "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021. "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers 2110.08563, arXiv.org.
    2. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2022. "Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers," Papers 2211.12669, arXiv.org.
    3. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions Under Model Uncertainty," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_460, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions under Model Uncertainty," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 252, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

  2. Liu, Heng & Ghosh, Gagan, 2020. "A note on perfect correlated equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan & Sun, Yang, 2022. "A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

  3. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.

    Cited by:

    1. Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola, 2019. "An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 289-315.
    2. Rosato, Antonio, 2023. "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    3. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.

  4. Gagan Ghosh & Steven Stong, 2018. "Strategic budgets in sequential elimination contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 499-524, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2018. "The Role of Budget Contraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1777, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Paan Jindapon & Zhe Yang, 2020. "Free riders and the optimal prize in public‐good funding lotteries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1289-1312, September.

  5. Gagan Ghosh, 2015. "Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 253-274, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.

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