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Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections

Author

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  • Arlegi, Ritxar
  • Dimitrov, Dinko

Abstract

We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.

Suggested Citation

  • Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2020. "Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:194:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520302615
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109418
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2020. "Fair elimination-type competitions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(2), pages 528-535.
    2. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    3. Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017. "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    4. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
    5. Bjørn Rasch, 2014. "Insincere voting under the successive procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 499-511, March.
    6. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2017. "Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1477-1506, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agenda; Binary tree; Elections; Manipulation; Sequential voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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