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Integer game with delay

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  • Artemov, Georgy

Abstract

In this note, we study a version of a war of attrition, in which the players pick delays and the player with the longest delay wins. Unlike the war of attrition, all players have to experience the longest delay before the consumption takes place. We show that the game has no mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The game can be seen as a re-interpretation of the integer game, which is one of the most important and most criticized constructions in the full implementation literature. Unlike the integer game, it has a well-defined best response against any mixed strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Artemov, Georgy, 2020. "Integer game with delay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s016517652030015x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108968
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. , & ,, 2008. "Caller Number Five and related timing games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    3. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Full implementation; Integer game; War of attrition; Best response property; Delay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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