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Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings

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  • Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G.
  • Petrakis, Emmanuel
  • Skartados, Panagiotis

Abstract

We investigate the incentives of a high-quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard-quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings (PPOs). We identify the conditions under which there exists an ownership threshold to make such a free transfer profitable for the high-quality firm and show that these conditions are more stringent under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Finally, we show that technology transfer increases aggregate output, industry-wide profits, consumers surplus, and social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G. & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis, 2019. "Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 22-25.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:177:y:2019:i:c:p:22-25
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Jing Fang & Jingyi Huang & Chenhang Zeng, 2024. "Passive cross‐holdings, horizontal differentiation, and welfare," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 508-528, April.
    2. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2020. "Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    3. Hariskos, W. & Königstein, M. & Papadopoulos, K.G., 2022. "Anti-competitive effects of partial cross-ownership: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 399-409.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2021. "Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 147-174, October.
    5. Ji Sun & Leonard F. S. Wang, 2023. "Vertical cross‐ownership, input price discrimination, and social welfare," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(2), pages 290-308, June.
    6. Lili Xu & Yidan Zhang & Sang‐Ho Lee, 2024. "Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(1), pages 283-297, January.
    7. Bayona, Anna & López, Ángel L. & Manganelli, Anton-Giulio, 2022. "Common ownership, corporate control and price competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1066-1075.
    8. Cho, Sumi & Kim, Doori & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2021. "Free licensing strategy and ex post privatization in a mixed oligopoly," MPRA Paper 106126, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Leonardos, Stefanos & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2021. "Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    10. Chuyuan Zhang & Sang‐Ho Lee, 2023. "Foreign passive ownership and tariff‐induced free technology transfer under vertical integration," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 91(2), pages 89-117, March.
    11. Pin Zhou & Hong Hong, 2022. "Horizontal partial shareholding, dual purpose concern, and mixed duopoly competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3107-3115, October.
    12. Cho, Sumi & Kim, Doori & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2022. "Free licensing strategy and ex-post privatization policy with passive ownership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    13. Shi, Yuan & Wang, Xinhua & Gao, Hongwei, 2021. "Profit formulation and equilibrium strategy of firms with cross-shareholding," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Passive partial ownership; Product innovation; Technology transfer; Imperfectly competitive markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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