Cross-shareholdings and competition in a rent-seeking contest
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102625
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Cited by:
- Serhii Bardash & Tetiana Osadcha, 2021. "Ontology of Variability of Accounting for Financial Rent," Oblik i finansi, Institute of Accounting and Finance, issue 2, pages 5-10, June.
- Jonas Send, 2020. "Exclusivity of Groups in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-19, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Xingtang Wang & Leonard F. S. Wang & Huizhong Liu, 2024. "Cross-ownership and managerial delegation under vertical product differentiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 143(2), pages 161-181, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Rent-seeking contest; Rent dissipation; Cross-shareholdings;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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