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Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions

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  • Leoni, Patrick
  • Lundtofte, Frederik

Abstract

We explore the link between informativeness of signals, stochastic dominance and equilibrium bids in a multi-unit auction with risk averse bidders. We show that for a particular class of signal distributions, informativeness is related to conditional first-order stochastic dominance, so that a higher degree of informativeness in the signal-fundamental distribution induces higher bids and therefore higher revenues. Our framework is relevant for discussing total revenues and informativeness in US Treasury auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Leoni, Patrick & Lundtofte, Frederik, 2017. "Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 80-82.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:80-82
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2013. "Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2404-2435.
    2. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    3. Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2015. "Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-74.
    4. Brandt, Nikolai & Drees, Burkhard & Eckwert, Bernhard & Várdy, Felix, 2014. "Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 604-611.
    5. Ali, Mukhtar M., 1975. "Stochastic dominance and portfolio analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 205-229, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common value auctions; Informativeness; Stochastic dominance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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