Unidimensional median voter results in probabilistic voting models
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- Coughlin, Peter J., 1984. "Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-12, October.
- Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
- Hinich, Melvin J., 1977.
"Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
- Hinich, M., 1976. "Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact," Working Papers 119, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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