On the IENBR-solvability of two-person finite games
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.023
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More about this item
Keywords
Iterated elimination of never best responses; Rationalizable strategies; Best response acyclic games; Strongly solvable games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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