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Support notions for belief functions

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  • Dominiak, Adam
  • Eichberger, Jürgen

Abstract

In this note we compare several support notions for capacities and sets of multiple priors. We characterize these support notions in the context of belief functions and show how they affect the analysis of games when players face strategic ambiguity.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominiak, Adam & Eichberger, Jürgen, 2016. "Support notions for belief functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 28-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:28-32
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    2. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    3. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2014. "Optimism And Pessimism In Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 483-505, May.
    4. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    5. Chateauneuf, Alain & Jaffray, Jean-Yves, 1989. "Some characterizations of lower probabilities and other monotone capacities through the use of Mobius inversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 263-283, June.
    6. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
    7. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Additive Representation of Non-Additive Measures and the Choquet Integral," Discussion Papers 985, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
    9. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
    10. Matthew J. Ryan, 2002. "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 47-65.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.
    2. Lorenz Hartmann & David Kelsey, 2024. "Location Invariance and Games with Ambiguity," Discussion Papers 2024-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    4. Adam Dominiak & Ani Guerdjikova, 2021. "Special Issue on Ambiguity and Strategic Interactions in Honor of Jürgen Eichberger," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 301-307, May.
    5. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Min Suk, 2017. "Coherent Dempster–Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 42-54.

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    Keywords

    Capacities; Support; Equilibrium;
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