Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.004
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More about this item
Keywords
Managerial compensation; Corporate hedging; Earnings management;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
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