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An example of conflicts of interest as pandering disincentives

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  • Chiba, Saori
  • Leong, Kaiwen

Abstract

Consider an uninformed decision maker (DM) who communicates with a partially informed agent through cheap talk. DM can choose a project to implement or the outside option of no project. Unlike the current literature, we show that if there exists multiple dimensions of conflicts of interests between a single agent and a single receiver (DM), an increase in the conflict of interest in one dimension may actually improve cheap talk communication given that it acts as a countervailing force to conflicts of interest in other dimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiba, Saori & Leong, Kaiwen, 2015. "An example of conflicts of interest as pandering disincentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 20-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:20-23
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik, 2013. "Pandering to Persuade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 47-79, February.
    2. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2019. "Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 520-540, June.
    2. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2023. "Countervailing Conflicts of Interest in Delegation Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-20, November.
    3. Saori Chiba, 2024. "Information Transmission and Countervailing Biases in Organizations," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-25, May.
    4. Hideshi Itoh & Kimiyuki Morita, 2023. "Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 446-463, January.
    5. Saori CHIBA & Kaiwen LEONG, 2018. "Information Aggregation and Countervailing Biases in Organizations," Discussion papers e-18-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Conflicts of interest; Pandering;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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